In addition to the “receipts” discourse necessary to the dissertation’s genre, Molloy’s effort to disentangle “access” from “instruction” meshes obviously well with some of the other issues our course has considered. We’ve thus far spoken a lot about admissions as a gatekeeping mechanism—one, to be sure, Molloy says drove much of CUNY’s midcentury changes. It seems to me—and this is the first time I’ve thought this thought, so I’m not sure if it’s (1) particularly good or (2) particularly novel—that posing the admissions question/threshold/barrier/whatever in terms of “standards met” means we’re missing a key potential indicator of college success—one that’s probably more valuable a heuristic than SAT scores, grades, class rank, or recommendations combined: intention (or “will,” or “motivation,” or “drive” or whatever you want to call it).
This thought occurred to me most clearly for the first time during Molloy’s discussion of Berger, Ballard, and Sohmer’s review of “eligible candidates” (68) for the early SEEK program. This passage specifically prompts my point:
On June 14, 1965, Levy reported a large “reservoir” of applicants, from which he expected to find one hundred “qualified students” […]. But the several hundred applications received through CUNY’s admission processing centers produced only a few dozen acceptable candidates. “The rest could not qualify by any standards we contemplated” (Levy & Berger, 1965, November, p. 19). Instead, Ballard, Berger and Sohmer recruited students through community agencies […]. These efforts produced 500 more applicants, “half or so of which had to be rejected on economic grounds. […] From the remaining pool of about 250 qualifying students, Berger, Ballard, and Sohmer […] selected the first class of 113 students[.] (67-68)
Presumably, hopeful matriculants who submitted applications but “could not qualify by any standards [the board] contemplated” (67) had some intention to go to college. (If they didn’t, they wouldn’t have submitted applications in the first place!) But while the “““standards””” discourse is, as Molloy argues, “a respectable proxy argument for resistance to integration” (85), motivation and intention can’t be similarly argued away.
In a previous blog post, I gestured towards the obfuscatory role the “““standards””” thesis takes in order to point towards an irony: Columbia’s earlier precedent “““standards””” argument prefaces our own age’s opaque admissions “complexities.” As our readings clearly show, CUNY history is not without its own ironies: what was once an institutional refuge for the Jews Columbia rejected is now in this midcentury moment reinscribing the wrongs its beginnings sought to address and remit. The “elite delusion of superiority” (44) Molloy seizes on in these chapters is born from exactly the same gatekeeping attitude that motivated Columbia’s own racist practices.
Through Berger, Molloy suggests we ought to disentangle traditional metrics of “““merit””” from a student’s “innate ability” (94). This is a notion that’s obviously useful. But what I’d like to push is this question of “ability”: even if we reject “standards” arguments more generally, doesn’t focusing on “innate ability” reinscribe “ability” as a standard of its own? In other words: if we set “ability” as a “standard” of sorts, one that admissions criteria attempt somehow to quantify—even if it’s amorphous or difficult to measure—doesn’t that mean we’re missing altogether the question of motivation? Attributing motivation and commitment to academic study only based on the fact that a student has submitted an application might be too flimsy a pretext. But is this flimsiness altogether a bad thing? Such a flimsiness doesn’t necessarily amount to an open admissions policy, though at first glance it appears that it might. If we read the admissions office as the primary mouthpiece for institutional policy and direction, then wouldn’t fixing motivation as the only or the most significant admissions criteria be a more “““honest”””—honest, I mean, to CUNY’s own history (or perhaps: histories)? And if we evaluate “““merit””” or “““achievement””” by any other “standard” than that of motivation, what does it betray about our own purposes and aims?
The SEEK program was clearly an improvement. But I wonder: what happens when we commit to this apparently radical reorientation (from “ability” to “motivation”)? And is such a reorientation all that radical? In the etymological sense, yes: insofar as motivation is something shared among all potential applicants, it’s the most “radical” or foundational shared attribute. But in a more colloquial sense it’s not necessarily all that radical, especially when we recall CUNY’s ostensible mandate—as an institution of higher learning funded by, dedicated to, and helping alongside the city and all her various inhabitants.
[Finally, a provoking editorial: New York spits out all her unmotivated children; hers is a brutal language of implicit “standards” and “merit.” We ought not to underestimate the extent to which intention, aspiration, and will play in achieving these “standards” or meeting these designations of “merit.” She’s not a meritocracy, to be sure—far from it. But we might want her to be one—but only on the condition that she not sacrifice her primary currency, which driven ambition. It’s only fitting, then, that her university system prize ambition—insofar as submitting an application indicates commitment—as the only suitable “““standard.”””]